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As the purpose of encryption is to limit access to 
information, it is no surprise that it has also limited 
law enforcement’s access to digital evidence. The 
government is often left with no choice but to force the 
owner to decrypt the data. Since owners are typically 
suspected of a crime, the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, which provides no person can be 
compelled to testify against themself, should protect 
them. This article reviews the cases that have occurred 
to date and identifies the principles to emerge from 
them.
Introduction
In an increasingly digitized world, encryption is an 
integral security feature to protect data. Encryption uses 
computer code to change plain, readable information 
into unreadable random letters, numbers and symbols. 
Encryption safeguards sensitive information by only 
allowing this unreadable information – effectively 
gibberish – to be converted or deciphered into readable 
language through a specific code, commonly known as an 
‘encryption key.’
What was once considered security for the highly 
technical (and the slightly paranoid) is now an established 
part of modern technology. Apple’s operating system, 
OS X, includes ‘File Vault,’ a program that allows users 
to encrypt the files in their home folders. Microsoft’s 
Windows operating system has included Bitlocker Drive 
encryption since 2008. And information stored on-line, 
such as credit card or social security numbers are typically 
stored in an encrypted form as a means of safeguarding 
them from data theft.
As encryption gains widespread acceptance across 
the digital landscape, law enforcement investigators 
are beginning to encounter it in the course of searching 
through electronic devices suspected of containing 
evidence of a crime. The purpose of encryption is to 
prevent someone without the key from unlocking 
the data, and so naturally law enforcement efforts to 
bypass encryption by ‘cracking’ – that is, by guessing 
the password that protects the key – are routinely 
unsuccessful. When this happens, the only option is 
to seek the owner’s assistance in either decrypting the 
device, or providing a plain text copy of the contents of 
the drive. Since the owners are frequently suspected of 
committing a crime, it comes as no surprise that many 
are reluctant to willingly assist investigators make a 
case against them. Moreover, owners have argued that 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which protects 
a person from being compelled to incriminate himself, 
protects them.
But what are the contours of this ancient constitutional 
right and this emerging technology? While the 
combination of numbers and letters needed to decrypt an 
encrypted device is often referred to as a ‘key,’ the United 
States Supreme Court has distinguished between a key 
and a combination. A person may be compelled to turn 
over a physical key, but cannot be compelled to turn over 
a combination he knows only in his mind.
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or a key? This article attempts to answer that question by 
looking closely at the few cases to address the issue.
A brief outline of the Fifth Amendment right 
against self incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
contains a number of rights intended to protect the 
common citizen against government abuse in legal 
proceedings. The portion relevant here states that 
no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself.’1  This is known as the 
privilege against ‘self incrimination,’ and is intended as ‘a 
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to 
extort communications’ from an individual.2
There are two issues a court must decide when 
analyzing the right against self-incrimination. The first 
is whether the Fifth Amendment right applies. If it does, 
the second issue is to determine the extent of immunity 
necessary to protect the privilege.
Whether the Fifth Amendment applies
To be protected by the Fifth Amendment, a person needs 
to show three things: (1) compulsion; (2) incrimination; 
and (3) a testimonial communication or act.3  Compulsion 
and testimony go hand in hand. The Fifth Amendment 
is not violated if the government sends a subpoena 
requesting information from documents voluntarily 
compiled – such as in a tax return – that has incriminating 
information because nothing has been compelled by the 
government.4  A statement is incriminating if the answer 
either supports a conviction in a federal criminal case, 
or provides a ‘link in the chain of evidence’ to lead to 
incriminating evidence, even if the statement itself is not 
inculpatory.5 
The most important – and the most disputed – aspect 
of the Fifth Amendment is the requirement of ‘testimony.’ 
That term refers not only to the act of speaking words 
from a person’s mouth, but also to the act of producing 
documents.6  Crucially, a person must make use of the 
‘contents of his own mind’ to communicate a statement of 
fact.7  For example, the act of producing documents could 
be considered ‘testimony’ if by producing the documents, 
the witness would be admitting that documents existed, 
were authentic, and in his possession or control.8 
There are two ways an act of production can be deemed 
non-testimonial. First, if the government compels a 
person to do a mere physical act that does not force an 
individual to make use of the contents of his mind, that 
act is non-testimonial.9  With this rationale, the court 
has found acts varied as providing the key to a safe,10  
standing in a photographic lineup,11  proving a voice 
exemplar,12  handwriting exemplar,13  or blood sample14  to 
be non-testimonial.
Second, if the government can show with ‘reasonable 
particularity’ that at the time it sought to compel 
production it already knew of the existence of the 
materials it was seeking, the Fifth Amendment is not 
implicated.15  In other words, since turning over the 
information – emptying the contents of one’s mind – 
would not reveal anything to the government that it did 
not already know, the testimony was simply a ‘foregone 
conclusion.’16  To the Supreme Court, ‘no constitutional 
rights are touched’ because the government was 
not relying on the ‘truth telling’ of the defendant, 
and therefore ‘the question is not of testimony but 
of surrender.’17  If a court has done this analysis and 
determined that the government is attempting to compel 
incriminating testimony, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
applies.
The scope of immunity
Once determining the Fifth Amendment applies, the 
court must next determine whether it can craft immunity 
sufficient to preserve the privilege, but still provide 
the government with the testimony it seeks. Courts 
have recognized that the government has a ‘right to 
every man’s evidence’ and can force a person to testify 
through a subpoena.18  If the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
against self-incrimination was absolute and could never 
be defeated, it is doubtful that the government could 
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and United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 
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221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911) (quotations 
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18 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443 (citing Piemonte v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2 (1961), 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 
n. 15, and Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 
(1896)).
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ever investigate crime through the use of testimony. 
Thus, immunity statutes have long been a ‘rational 
accommodation’ between the Fifth Amendment privilege 
and the government’s ability to compel individuals to 
testify.19 
The federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002, states 
that if an order to testify has been given to a witness,
… the witness may not refuse to comply with the order 
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; 
but no testimony or other information compelled under 
the order (or any information directly or indirectly 
derived from such testimony or other information) may 
be used against the witness in any criminal case …
In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the 
Supreme Court explained that historically, any immunity 
granted under a statute, including 18 U.S.C. § 6002, must 
be ‘coextensive’ with the Fifth Amendment privilege.20  
That means the immunity must prohibit the government 
‘from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence 
derived directly and indirectly therefrom.’21  These two 
forms of immunity have been described as ‘use’ and 
‘derivative use’ immunity.
To review, a court must first decide whether the 
government is trying to compel incriminating testimony. 
If it is, the court must grant immunity that prohibits the 
government from not only using the words spoken or the 
act done against the person (typically in a trial), but also 
from using any other evidence obtained as a result of that 
testimony.
The Fifth Amendment and decryption 
Turning to the issue of decryption, there are two primary 
questions encountered in the cases: (1) whether the act of 
decryption is ‘testimony;’ and (2) whether the government 
can grant immunity solely for the act of decryption 
while retaining the ability to use evidence found on the 
computer.
The cases follow the same general set of facts. The 
government obtains a search warrant to search a 
computer suspected of containing evidence of a crime.22  
Once the government possesses the computer, they 
are unable to search it because it is encrypted, and the 
government’s forensic experts are unable to ‘crack’ it. 
The government’s only option is to go to the computer’s 
owner and request they decrypt the computer, or 
provide a copy of the computer’s contents in plain text. 
Under these set of facts, there is both compulsion and 
incrimination. Generally, the individual has chosen not to 
help, leaving the government to go to court and request 
judicial intervention by ordering the person to decrypt.23  
There is also incrimination. In the three cases discussed, 
the individuals were suspected of a variety of crimes, 
including one individual already under indictment at the 
time of the government’s request.24 
The difficult issue then, is whether the act of decryption 
is testimonial, and if so, the extent of immunity to 
be granted. It is important to note that the issue of 
‘testimony’ in the decryption context is not about whether 
the decrypted contents of the computers – the files – are 
‘testimonial’ under the Fifth Amendment. As explained 
above, despite whatever incriminating character the 
files may have, the creation of the documents were 
not ‘compelled’ since the government did not force the 
defendant to create them.25  Rather the issue is whether 
the act of decrypting the computer, or producing a 
decrypted version of the information, is ‘testimonial’ 
under the Fifth Amendment. And if it is ‘testimonial,’ 
the degree of immunity required to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher, 
2009 WL 424718 (D.Vt. 2009)
Boucher approached the United States border from 
Canada near Vermont. Border agents saw a laptop 
computer in the back seat of the car, which Boucher 
admitted was his. An agent decided to inspect the 
computer and found approximately 40,000 photographs 
on it.26  The images included both adult and child 
pornography.27  After Boucher waived his Miranda rights, 
he agreed to speak to the agents and opened files on the 
‘Z drive’ on the computers at the officers’ request. After 
viewing more images and videos of child pornography in 
the ‘Z drive,’ the agents arrested Boucher and confiscated 
his laptop. Later, agents obtained a search warrant. While 
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19 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446. 
20 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449 (citing Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 54, 78, 
(1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 
547, 585 (1892)).
21 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
22 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d at 1339-40 
(hereinafter In re Grand Jury Subpoena); 
United States v. Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 *2-3 
(D. Colo. 2012); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
to Sebastien Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 *2 
(D.Vt. 2009) (hereinafter Boucher).
23 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 
1339 (government request for grand jury 
subpoena), Fricosu, 2009 WL 424718 at *2 
(government request for order under All 
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2651); Boucher, 2009 WL 
424718 at *2 (government request for grand 
jury subpoena).
24 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d 
at 1339 (suspected of possessing child 
pornography); Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 
at *2 (suspected of possessing child 
pornography); Fricosu, 2009 WL 424718 at 
*2 (indicted for mortgage fraud).
25 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43.
26 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *1.
27 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *2.
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creating a mirror image of the contents of the laptop, 
they discovered that the ‘Z drive’ from which Boucher had 
previously opened files for the officers was encrypted. 
As a result, the officers were unable to take a mirror copy 
of the contents of the ‘Z drive.’ The federal government 
convened a grand jury, which issued a subpoena 
initially directing Boucher to provide the password to 
the authorities. After a magistrate judge found28  the act 
of disclosing the password would reveal the contents 
of Boucher’s mind in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 
the grand jury narrowed its request to require Boucher 
to provide the unencrypted contents of the computer 
instead.29  Boucher challenged this as a violation of his 
Fifth Amendment right against forced incrimination.30 
The trial court disagreed. It found the ‘foregone 
conclusion’ doctrine rendered the act of producing the 
decrypted contents of the computer non-testimonial.31  
The government knew of the existence and location 
of the files since Boucher had showed them to the 
officers personally. Nor did the order compel Boucher 
to authenticate the contents of the computer, since he 
had already done so by admitting the laptop was his 
and showing officers files and folders on it.32  Thus, 
providing access again did ‘little or nothing to the sum 
total of the Government’s information.’33  It did not 
matter that Boucher had not shown the officers the entire 
contents of the Z drive. Under Second Circuit precedent, 
the government was not required to be aware of the 
incriminatory contents of the files, just that it knew of the 
existence and location of ‘subpoenaed documents.’34  The 
court ordered Boucher to provide the government with 
the decrypted contents of the computer, but prohibited 
the government from using the act of production to 
authenticate the files in court.35 
United States v. Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 (D. 
Colo. 2012)36  
FBI agents executed a search warrant at the home of 
Ramona Fricosu, seizing a number of computers.37  One 
of the laptops found in Fricosu’s bedroom was encrypted, 
and identified itself as ‘RS.WORKGROUP.Ramona’ on the 
whole disk encryption screen.38  At the time of the search, 
Fricosu’s ex-husband and co-defendant was incarcerated 
on unrelated charges. The day after the search, Fricosu’s 
husband spoke to her over the telephone from prison.39  
The telephone call was recorded and included Fricosu 
telling her ex-husband ‘they will have to ask for my help,’ 
‘can they get past what they need to get past to get to it,’ 
and ‘my lawyer said I’m not obligated by law to give them 
any passwords or anything they need to figure things 
out for themselves.’40  The FBI was unable to decrypt 
the laptop and sought to compel Fricosu to provide the 
unencrypted contents of the computer. Fricosu objected, 
claiming her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination would be lost.
The trial court, acknowledging the ‘small universe’ of 
cases involving the Fifth Amendment and decryption, 
followed the decision in Boucher and found no Fifth 
Amendment violation under the ‘foregone conclusion’ 
doctrine.41  The court found the government had 
conclusively proven the computer belonged to Fricosu 
on the basis of where it was found in the house, its 
identification as ‘RS.WORKGROUP.Ramona,’ and the 
comments Fricosu made on the telephone to her ex-
husband.42  The court granted Fricosu immunity on the act 
of producing the unencrypted contents of the computer, 
but did not prohibit the government from using the files 
found on the computer against her.43 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated 
March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012)44
Law enforcement officials were investigating an 
individual suspected of distributing child pornography.45  
Investigators were able to determine the IP addresses the 
suspect used to upload images and ultimately identified a 
specific individual, referred to as ‘John Doe’ in the opinion. 
Officers obtained a search warrant to search a hotel 
room Doe was staying in and seized two laptops and five 
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28 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, 
2007 WL 4246473 (D.Vt. 2007). The 
magistrate held forcing Boucher to decrypt 
would violate his Fifth Amendment right to 
not incriminate himself. The government 
appealed that decision, and the district 
court judge ultimately agreed with the 
government, reversing the magistrate. See 
Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *1.
29 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at 2. 
30 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *2.
31  Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *3.
32 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *4.
33 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *3 (quoting 
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 41) (quotations omitted).
34 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *3 (quoting In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated 
Oct. 29, 1992 (United States v. Doe), 1 F.3d 
87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted)).
35 Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 at *4.
36 In the interest of full disclosure, the author 
co-wrote an amicus brief on behalf of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation in support of 
Fricosu’s challenge to compelled decryption.
37 Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 at *1.
38 Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 at *1.
39 Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 at *2.
40 Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 at *2.
41 Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 at *2.
42 Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 at *4.
43 Fricosu, 2012 WL 182121 at *5. After the judge 
ordered Fricosu to provide the decrypted 
contents of the computer, the government 
was able to decrypt the computer without 
her assistance when the co-defendant 
agreed to decrypt the computer instead.
44 In the interest of full disclosure, the author 
co-wrote an amicus brief on behalf of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation in support of 
Doe’s attempt to not decrypt.
45 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1339.
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external hard drives. FBI forensic examiners attempted 
to analyze the contents of the computers and drives, but 
were unable to obtain access to portions of the drives, 
which were encrypted.46 
A grand jury subpoena was issued to Doe, requiring him 
to produce the unencrypted contents of the drives, and 
any data contained inside. Doe objected that compliance 
would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Federal prosecutors offered Doe immunity 
for the act of decrypting the computer, but wanted to 
reserve the right to use any evidence it found on the 
computer against Doe.47 
Doe refused to cooperate with the government, and 
ultimately he was brought before a judge who held a 
hearing on the issue. The most important testimony was 
that of a forensic examiner, who testified that the drives 
had been encrypted with ‘TrueCrypt’ software that could 
create partitions within a hard drive that makes some data 
inaccessible, even if other portions of the hard drive could 
be accessed.48  The examiner testified he had obtained 
access to parts of the drives that were seized, only to find 
them blank with no data.49  He also noted there could still 
be data on the encrypted part of the drive, but that he did 
not know for certain, and admitted there could be nothing 
on the drives.50
Doe argued that by decrypting the computer, the 
government would be getting derivative use of his 
immunized testimony.51  In essence, he would be 
testifying that he, instead of someone else, placed the 
contents on the hard drive, encrypted the contents and 
could retrieve and examine them as he wished.52  Notably, 
there was no testimony in the record that Doe could 
decrypt the computer or he was the only person with 
access to the devices.53  The court disagreed with Doe, 
finding that compelling him to produce the unencrypted 
contents of the hard drives would not constitute the 
derivative use of compelled testimony, because Doe’s 
act of decryption and production was not ‘testimony.’54  It 
held Doe in contempt of court for refusing to decrypt the 
drives, and committed him to the custody of the United 
States Marshal until he was released by the appellate 
court on 15 December 2011.
Reviewing the decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the decision, finding that Doe’s Fifth 
Amendment rights had been violated.55  It found that 
decryption was not merely a physical act, like providing 
officers with a key, but rather it would force Doe to use 
the contents of his mind, similar to providing officers 
the combination to a safe.56  It was the equivalent of 
Doe testifying about the knowledge and existence of 
incriminating files, as well as his possession, control and 
access to the encrypted drives and the ability to decrypt.57 
The court also found that the government had failed 
to show that the testimony was a ‘foregone conclusion,’ 
noting that there was nothing in the record that revealed 
the government knew whether files existed on the 
drive, where they were located, or that Doe was capable 
of decrypting them.58  It rejected the government’s 
suggestion that the fact the drives were encrypted meant 
Doe was trying to hide something. It noted ‘[j]ust as a 
vault is capable of storing mountains of incriminating 
documents, that alone does not mean that it contains 
incriminating documents, or anything at all.’59 
Critically, it provided guidance about the showing the 
government must make to carry its burden under the 
‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine:
‘if the Government is unaware of a particular file name, 
it still must show with some reasonable particularity 
that it seeks a certain file and is aware, based on other 
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46 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1339.
47 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1339.
48 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1340. 
49 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1340 
n. 10.
50 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1340.
51 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1339.
52 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1339.
53 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1340 
n. 9.
54 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1341.
55 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346.
56 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346 
(citing Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43).
57 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346.
58 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346-
47.
59 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1347.
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information, that (1) the file exists in some specified 
location, (2) the file is possessed by the target of the 
subpoena, and (3) the file is authentic.’60 
It was the knowledge ‘based on other information’ that 
distinguished the case from Boucher and Fricosu, since in 
those cases the government had knowledge of what was 
on the computer through Boucher’s actions of displaying 
them to the officers, and with Fricosu discussing the 
content on the telephone call with her ex-husband that 
was recorded.61  In sum, ‘although the Government need 
not know the name of a particular file or account, it still 
must be able to establish that a file or account, whatever 
its label, does in fact exist.’62  The government was unable 
to do that.
Turning to the issue of immunity, it ruled the use 
immunity offered Doe was insufficient, and that derivative 
use immunity was necessary. Noting the critical issue 
was ‘what conduct was actually immunized and what 
use would the Government make of the evidence derived 
from such conduct in a future prosecution,’ it ruled that 
the federal immunity statute ‘clearly immunizes both the 
use of the testimony itself and any information derived 
from the testimony.’63  That meant no evidence found on 
the drives could be used against Doe if he were to decrypt 
the drives, since any files found would be ‘directly or 
indirectly derived from’ the compelled testimony.64 
Decrypting the principles 
While it is certainly no easy task deciphering overarching 
principles from only three cases, principles emerge 
nonetheless. Beginning with the issue of whether 
decryption is ‘testimony,’ all three cases seem to 
recognize that the act of decryption was not a mere 
physical act, reminiscent of turning over a key, but rather 
revealed the contents of one’s mind. While Boucher and 
Fricosu did not explicitly say this, the government in all 
three cases provided immunity for the act of producing 
the decrypted contents of the computer. As the Eleventh 
Circuit noted, if ‘the decryption of the hard drives 
would not constitute testimony, one must ask, “Why 
did the Government seek, and the district court grant, 
immunity.”’65  The ‘obvious’ answer for the Eleventh 
Circuit is that ‘decryption would be testimonial.’66  The 
decision in Boucher and Fricosu follow this line of 
thought implicitly by giving use immunity from the act of 
production or decrypting the computers. In other words, 
of the two ways an act could be non-testimonial (either 
as a mere physical act or under the ‘foregone conclusion’ 
doctrine), the idea of decryption as a mere physical act 
appears to have been rejected.
The conclusion in Boucher and Fricosu that decryption 
would not violate the Fifth Amendment was based on 
the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine. If anything, the 
determination of whether the Fifth Amendment is violated 
by compelling decryption is a factually intensive one. And 
both Boucher and Fricosu used the facts to determine 
that the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine applied. The 
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged this when crafting its 
standard, requiring the government to show that the 
person they want to compel, possessed an authentic file 
that actually exists ‘based on other information.’67  In both 
Boucher and Fricosu, ‘other information’ existed. Boucher 
showed the agents the files himself. Fricosu discussed 
the files over the telephone with her ex-husband and was 
clearly associated with the computer. In Doe’s case, the 
government did not have ‘other information.’
Although Boucher’s belief that the ‘foregone 
conclusion’ controlled is compelling, Fricosu’s same 
belief is markedly less so. Fricosu noted there was ‘little 
question’ that the government knew of the existence 
and location of the computer files, but stated that the 
‘fact that it does not know the specific content of any 
specific documents is not a barrier to production.’68  It 
appears the court conflated the point that the government 
had proven Fricosu had control of the computer with 
the government’s knowledge as to the existence of 
documents on the computer relevant to the criminal 
investigation. This proof would seem unlikely to meet the 
Eleventh Circuit’s more demanding standard, although 
the other information known to the government in Fricosu 
was enough to at least distinguish Fricosu’s situation from 
Doe’s.
Turning to the issue of immunity, it seems clear that 
the government can only compel decryption with a 
promise of not just use but also derivative use immunity, 
prohibiting the government from using any evidence 
it obtains once the device is decrypted. This stems 
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60 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1349 
n. 28 (citing United States v. Norwood, 420 
F.3d 888, 895–96 (8th Cir. 2005)).
61 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1348, 
1349 n. 27.
62 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1349.
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clearly from the Supreme Court’s decision in Kastigar as 
well as the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002. 
Neither Boucher or Fricosu reached this issue since the 
‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine applied, but it appears the 
government has lost this dispute.
Conclusion
So it appears that compelling decryption is like revealing 
a combination, rather than handing over a physical 
key. In some cases, the government may have to make 
a decision. It can either attempt to compel a person to 
decrypt an electronic device with the understanding that 
it cannot use the act of decryption, or anything found 
on the computer against the person. Or it can continue 
to attempt to ‘crack’ the encryption itself, reserving the 
right to later use whatever it finds against the electronic 
device’s owner. The government’s efforts to convince 
a court to allow compelled decryption will be better 
served if it can make a strong showing through ‘other 
information’ learned through independent investigation 
that the files it wants are actually on the device, and the 
user has access to them. Similarly, encryption programs 
that obfuscate and hinder the government’s attempts to 
determine whether files actually exist on the device best 
serve a user who wants to protect his privacy.69 
Given the government’s choice, it seems the best 
course is for the government to make efforts to ‘crack’  
the decryption itself, without the user’s cooperation. 
To be fair, it appears this is what the government’s 
preference is, turning to compel decryption only when 
it has been unable to ‘crack’ the decryption itself. With 
advances in technology, the government may inevitably 
be able to crack decryption quicker and cheaper than 
before. If used properly – within the judicial constraint and 
supervision that comes from obtaining a search warrant 
– this technology can potentially create a situation that is 
good for everyone: the government gets all the evidence it 
is entitled to, and the user does not have to testify against 
himself.
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a combination or a key? the fifth amendment and privilege against compelled decryption
69 Of course, that obfuscation can you get into 
other forms of trouble with the government, 
such as a charge of anticipatory obstruction 
of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, but that is a 
topic for a different paper.
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